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FORWARD: LAW, LABOR, & GENDER
Jennifer Wriggins*
I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium issue of the Maine Law Review includes articles written for
a national conference held on September 14, 2002 in Portland, Maine entitled "Law,
Labor, & Gender." This event is part of a tradition of symposia and conferences on
law and gender at the University of Maine School of Law. The first conference,
"Justice and Gender," was held in October 1991, and was a lively and stimulating
event.1 In 1998, a very successful conference on Law, Feminism, and the Twenty-
First Century was held, which led to a varied and fascinating Maine Law Review
symposium issue.2 And in September 2002, over 180 law students, lawyers, judges,
and community members participated in a stimulating day-long conference. One
hallmark of all of the University of Maine School of Law conferences is the active
participation of law students, lawyers, and judges, as well as law professors, in
planning and executing the events. To give credit where it is due, students have
initiated the conferences. The wonderful collaboration that has taken place in put-
ting together the conferences and symposia is fitting for conferences with a femi-
nist theme, since it furthers feminist objectives of challenging traditional hierar-
chies.3
The theme of the conference, Law, Labor, & Gender, came out of a working
group comprised of law students, lawyers, a judge, and myself. We thought that a
number of issues deserved attention, ranging from current jurisprudence on em-
ployment discrimination to more theoretical issues having to do with work/family
dilemmas. Professor Deborah Rhode kindly accepted our invitation to be the key-
note speaker, and various other academic speakers also agreed to present papers.
The working group, and the editors of the Maine Law Review, drafted and sent out
a call for papers to approximately 1600 law professors and others. The Law Re-
view editors were gratified to receive more excellent proposals than the sympo-
sium had room for, and engaged in a difficult selection process. The response to
the call for papers led us to issues that we did not even know about,4 and resulted
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. Many thanks to the Editors of the
Maine Law Review, for their dedicated and skilled work on this Symposium issue. I want to
particularly thank Shawn Worden for his outstanding work in developing and following up on
the call for papers, Jennifer Williams for her superb work as Editor-in-Chief, and Sarah Marble
for her excellent work as conference organizer. Many thanks also to Dean Colleen A. Khoury
for her invaluable support of the conference and to Lois Lupica, Deborah Tuerkheimer, and
Sarah Marble for reviewing drafts of this introduction.
1. It led to the publication of Kathleen E. Mahoney's important article, The Constitutional
Law of Equality in Canada, 44 ME. L. REV. 229 (1992).
2. Symposium, Law, Feminism, & the Twenty-First Century, 50 ME. L. REv. 2 (1998).
3. As Martha Minow wrote in an earlier symposium issue, "[fror feminist critics, legal peda-
gogy should promote listening as well as talking and collaboration as well as individual excel-
lence." Martha Minow, Keeping Students Awake: Feminist Theory and Legal Education, 50
ME. L. REv. 337,338 (1998).
4. For example, the exception to Title VII for foreign-owned corporations and their subsidiar-
ies discussed by Keith Sealing was new to us. See Keith Sealing, Sex, Allies, and BFOQs: The
Case for Not Allowing Foreign Corporations to Violate Title VIi in the United States, 55 ME. L.
REV. 89 (2003).
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in a richer conference and symposium issue than we would have had otherwise.
Labor, which for present purposes is synonymous with "work"-what work is
performed, what gets recognized and valued as work, is deeply gendered, as histo-
rian Alice Kessler-Harris and others have shown.5 Images of "workers" for many
remain prototypically male (and white); images of "women's work" still resonate
with housework and care of young children. Wage disparities and gender segrega-
tion remain entrenched. 6 Race, ethnicity, age, and class, are also deeply impli-
cated in the ways that labor is performed, valued, and recognized. Law affects
labor and gender, in critically important ways, many of which are discussed in this
volume. Law works not just through formal prohibitions, but operates in myriad
background ways such as through creating incentives and structuring alternatives.
Some scholarship in this volume focuses on formal prohibitions, 7 while other work
emphasizes background rules and incentives. 8 Still other work focuses on both
aspects, as we see in Maria Ontiveros's multifaceted discussion of law and the
lives of female farmworkers9 and the article by Rebekah Smith, Luisa Deprez, and
Sandra Butler on education and welfare reform. 10
The devaluation of so-called "women's work," whether performed by wives
for no pay or by working-class women for little pay, is a longstanding and current
subject of feminist concern. Theorists trying to change the valuation of this work
have renamed it "care work" and called for various reforms. 11 Several of the
articles in this volume look at the debate over care work from new and challenging
angles. 12 Another article examines how new technology provides no escape from
the devaluation of work done by women. 13 The devaluation of "women's work" is
inseparable from gender stereotypes and the devaluation of women. Attention to
gender stereotypes and other factors that create barriers to women's advancement
is important, 14 as is attention to gender stereotypes that create barriers to the ad-
vancement of men who are effeminate, i.e. who are perceived as being like women. 15
5. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY (2000).
6. Tracy E. Higgins, Job Segregation, Gender Blindness, and Employee Agency, 55 ME. L.
REV. 241, 242 nn.3, 4 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Congressional Power to Regulate Sex Discrimination: The Effect
of the Supreme Court's "New Federalism," 55 ME. L. REV. 63 (2003); Elizabeth J. Wyman, The
Unenforced Promise of Equal Pay Acts: A National Problem and Possible Solution From Maine,
55 ME. L. REV. 23 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Libby Adler, An Essay on the Production of Youth Prostitution, 55 ME. L. REV.
191 (2003); Martha McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REV. 313 (2003).
9. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55
ME. L. REV. 157 (2003).
10. Rebekah Smith et al., The Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denying the Promise of
Postsecondary Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211 (2003).
11. Katharine Silbaugh defines care work as "meeting the needs of children, the elderly, the
sick, or the disabled." Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389
(2001).
12. Higgins, supra note 6; McCluskey, supra note 8; Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Care-
taking and the Contradictions of Contemporary Policy, 55 ME. L. REV. 289 (2003).
13. Michelle A. Travis, Telecommuting: The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55
ME. L. REV. 261 (2003).
14. Deborah L. Rhode, Keynote Address: The Difference "Difference" Makes, 55 ME. L.
REV. 15 (2003).
15. Richard F Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment
Discrimination, 55 ME. L. REV. 117 (2003). Storrow's article is not solely focused on discrimi-
nation against effeminate men but that is part of his concern.
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The categories of "law," "labor," and "gender" are not monolithic and their
content is contested. The rich collection of articles and essays that follows gives
us many fruitful ways to approach contemporary issues of law, labor, and gender.
II. THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
A good place to start in thinking about law, labor, and gender is to consider the
current state of sex discrimination law pertaining to employment. Recent Supreme
Court decisions challenge well-settled assumptions about Congress's power to
enforce constitutional rights through the Fourteenth Amendment and the Com-
merce Clause. Calvin Massey reviews the Court's recent refusals to defer to Con-
gressional findings of fact in the context of what the Court considers to be non-
commercial intrastate activities. He concludes that cases such as United States v.
Lopez16 and Morrison v. United States17 "may not herald much change in congres-
sional ability to prohibit sex discrimination by private or public employers, be-
cause such activity is surely a commercial activity, whether or not the activity is
intrastate." 18 In other words, for now, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,19
which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, reli-
gion, and national origin, is securely constitutional. 2 0 Yet, despite Title VII's broad
promise of formal sex equality, its reach is limited in important ways, as four other
papers in this symposium show.2 1
Massey also discusses a significant pending Supreme Court decision involv-
ing the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, Hibbs v. Nevada Department of Human Resources.22 In Hibbs, the Nevada
Department of Human Resources is arguing that the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) is unconstitutional as applied to the states because it exceeds the
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 unconstitutional and
requiring that Congress when it seeks to regulate intrastate noncommercial activity must show
that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce).
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding civil remedy of Violence Against Women Act unconstitu-
tional despite congressional findings that sex-motivated violence substantially affected inter-
state commerce).
18. Massey, supra note 7, at 66.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
20. However, he interestingly and disturbingly notes that it is possible that the Court could
find the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which forbids employment discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power. Massey, supra note
7, at 85. As he notes, the Supreme Court held in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not discrimination against women, and therefore it
might be hard to create a convincing legislative record that states have a pattern and history of
using pregnancy discrimination to engage in sex discrimination. Id.
21. Sealing, supra note 4; Storrow, supra note 15; Higgins, supra note 6; Ontiveros, supra
note 9. Mary Becker also attended the conference and gave a presentation on the limits of Title
VII, contrasting Troupe v. May Department Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), with a British
case, Case C-394/96, Brown v. Rentokil Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-4185 (1998). (Video on file with
Garbrecht Law Library, University of Maine School of Law). Troupe has been the subject of
considerable commentary, including by Mary Becker. See Mary Becker, Caring for Children
and Caretakers, 76 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1521 (2001); Judith G. Greenberg, The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce, 50
ME. L. REV. 225 (1998).
22. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert granted sub nom., 122 S.Ct. 2618 (2002).
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scope of Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 States
are very large employers, so a state exemption from the FMLA is extremely sig-
nificant. 24 The FMLA, passed in 1993, requires employers to offer up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave for certain family obligations and for an employee's own
health problems. 25 This statute, extremely modest in comparison with leave pro-
tections in other industrialized countries,26 has been repeatedly challenged. 27 The
contested status of this modest measure, when contrasted with proposals to re-
structure workplaces put forth by some care work theorists, presents a discourag-
ing picture. 28
It is not universally known that the FMLA, while expressed in gender-neutral
terms, was aimed to combat sex discrimination in employment. The family leave
provision of the FMLA forbids the practice of employers granting family leave to
women only. "This discrimination ... hurts men by not providing them equal
opportunity to care for their families and hurts women by effectively forcing them
into the caretaking role and thus making them less attractive as employees," Massey
notes. 29 As such, Congress's main purpose in enacting the Family and Medical
Leave Act was to "minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the
basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for ... compelling family
reasons, on a gender-neutral basis. ' 30 As Massey explains, depending on the speci-
ficity of findings that the Supreme Court requires for Congress to exercise its Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement power against the states, the decision may make it
very difficult for Congress to use its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power
"to create imaginative new remedies to address old and familiar problems" such as
those addressed by the FMLA.3 1
Any sustained attention to contemporary issues of labor and gender inevitably
requires consideration of "globalization" and international issues. Two of the sym-
posium articles deal with such issues. Keith Sealing's article deals with excep-
tions to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII that arise from foreign-
owned corporations doing business in the United States.32 Maria Ontiveros's ar-
ticle, discussed more fully below, examines the situation of women farmworkers
in California. 33 Sealing's contribution highlights a little-known but significant
23. See Massey, supra note 7, at 74, 75. In order for Congress to abrogate the states' sover-
eign immunity, it must act under its enforcement powers contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 68. Congress cannot waive states' sovereign immunity by using its powers under
the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8. See id.
24. At last count, 4.8 million people are employed by state governments. Linda Greenhouse,
In Family Leave Case, Supreme Court Steps Back Into Federalism Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2003, at 1-23.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
26. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 53-54 (1987).
27. Massey, supra note 7, at 73.
28. Michael Selmi and Naomi Cahn's piece refers to proposals to restructure the workplace
by writers such as Joan Williams. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 12, at 297. See generally Sympo-
sium, The Structures of Care Work, supra note 11; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, WHY
WORK AND FAMILY CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABoUT IT (2001).
29. Massey, supra note 7, at 74.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2000).
31. Massey, supra note 7, at 85.
32. Sealing, supra note 4.
33. Ontiveros, supra note 9.
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exception to Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrimination. Numerous cases
have interpreted a common treaty provision to mean that foreign corporations and
their domestic subsidiaries may discriminate against women in the United States.
Sealing examines the cases and contrasts them with the treaty provisions and Title
VII itself, showing how the decisions are contrary to the language of the treaty
provisions and how they have created the worst of all possible worlds for victims
of sex discrimination by foreign corporations and their domestic subsidiaries. 34
His article, showing that antidiscrimination law even within the United States al-
lows certain forms of cultural discrimination against women in employment, is a
useful contribution to the debate over issues of cultural universals and women. 35
His solution at this time, not surprisingly, is legislative. 36 If Massey is right that
employment discrimination laws are constitutionally secure, Congress should be
able to amend Title VII to close the loophole created by the decisions.
Richard Storrow's article examines another facet of Title VII; namely its limi-
tations as applied to transgendered workers trying to sue for sex discrimination. 37
This piece forms a thought-provoking part of the debates about the nature of gen-
der as it relates to antidiscrimination law.38 Title VII forbids employment dis-
crimination on the basis of "sex" but does not forbid discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or on the basis of transgendered status. Storrow shows how the
model of sex discrimination law as it has developed fails to assist transgendered
workers when they are discriminated against for failing to conform to gender ex-
pectations.
Storrow examines the "gender stereotyping" theory of Title VII, which origi-
nated in the 1989 Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.39 Simply
put, the female plaintiff in that case was not made a partner in an accounting firm
because, although she was an extremely effective worker, she was not feminine
enough. The Supreme Court held that such decisionmaking, based on an employee's
failure to conform to gender stereotypes, was illegal sex discrimination under Title
VII. This gave rise to the hope that workers who did not conform to gender stereo-
types, such as effeminate men, could sue for sex discrimination if they were dis-
criminated against on that basis. As Storrow notes, however, "effeminate men
discovered they were foreclosed from invoking the theory [of gender stereotyping
as sex discrimination], since courts invariably equated their effeminacy with ho-
mosexuality and reiterated that Title VII does not proscribe sexual orientation dis-
34. See generally Sealing, supra note 4.
35. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 31-54 (1999).
36. Sealing, supra note 4, at 115.
37. Storrow, supra note 15. Storrow writes:
"Transgendered" is a term meant to include all "individuals whose gendered self-
presentation (evidenced through dress, mannerisms, and even physiology) does not
correspond to the behaviors associated with the members of their biological sex."...
Not all transgendered individuals are transsexual. Transsexuals are individuals who
wish to conform their bodies to their gender identity and, by way of transition, take
hormones or submit to surgery to do so. Some transgendered individuals, though,
live as the opposite gender but do not take hormones or have surgery.
Id. at 135 n.147 (citations omitted).
38. See, e.g., Mary Ann C. Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
39. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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crimination. ' '40 He goes on to consider the effect of the Supreme Court's 1998
case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,4 1 which recognizes that same-
sex sexual harassment can be recognized as illegal sex discrimination under Title
VII on the gender stereotyping theory of sex discrimination. Discrimination against
effeminate men because they are perceived as being like women rather than being"manly" seems to be classic sex discrimination tied to the notion that women are
inferior to men, yet courts by and large have not seen it that way. Storrow's de-
scriptions of the impossible double binds created by courts (particularly for trans-
sexuals) are harrowing; his discussion of the promise and shortcomings of the
gender stereotyping theory is illuminating.
State antidiscrimination laws have become increasingly important. Even if it
ever was wise for advocates of workplace gender fairness to focus solely on fed-
eral statutes and federal courts, it certainly is not wise now. Elizabeth Wyman sets
forth a comprehensive discussion of state and federal equal pay acts and cases, and
provides a useful review of the potential benefits and limitations of these stat-
utes. 42 As Wyman shows, although there are "equal pay for equal work" statutes4 3
in most states and at the federal level, almost no cases are brought under these
statutes. Yet, women are still paid significantly less than men. There are many
reasons for this, of course, but as Wyman suggests, underenforcement of equal pay
acts may be an important reason. Part of the problem with using equal pay acts
involves the definition of equality, a familiar concern for feminists for decades.44
Many of the acts, even if broadly worded, require that jobs be "equal," which in
effect means virtually identical; any difference allows different, less favorable treat-
ment, which is not considered to be discriminatory. 45 Since few jobs are virtually
identical, women who bring claims almost always lose. This tendency to conflate
equality with sameness, which has bedeviled feminist efforts at reform in various
areas, can be partially resolved in this context by interpretations of equality that
allow for flexibility in comparison between jobs. This analytical move may be
useful for resolving equality dilemmas in other contexts. A flexible interpretation
is certainly allowed by many states' statutes. Regarding the lack of enforcement of
the statutes, Wyman suggests that a new administrative mechanism in Maine may
be more effective than the current court-based system and may serve as a model
for other states.4 6
I1. WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND LEADERSHIP
Deborah Rhode's keynote speech focuses on women and leadership with a
particular focus on women in the legal profession.47 Rhode usefully grounds her
40. Storrow, supra note 15, at 134.
41. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
42. See generally Wyman, supra note 7.
43. Also known as "equal pay acts."
44. See, e.g,, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 1-24 (2001); Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and The Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985).
45. Wyman, supra note 7, at 33-34.
46. Id. at 49-54.
47. Rhode, supra note 14. Robert Hirshon, Esq., Immediate Past President of the American
Bar Association, gave an outstanding introduction for Professor Rhode (videotape on file with
Garbrecht Law Library, University of Maine School of Law).
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piece on the extensive body of empirical literature on leadership. This is part of
her larger project on women and leadership that will result in a forthcoming col-
lection, The Difference "Difference" Makes.48 Despite formal equality in em-
ployment having been the law for almost forty years,4 9 women are underrepresented
in leadership positions in comparison to their numbers. A common explanation for
this underrepresentation is that it is a vestigial remnant of past discrimination,
soon to fade away into nothingness. Rhode convincingly refutes this explanation.
Moreover, she states that "[a]t current rates of change, it would take about three
centuries for women to reach parity in Congress or in executive suites.,,50 In seek-
ing to explain the continued dominance of men in leadership positions, she turns to
informal and structural aspects of employment and society. She asserts that
"[w]omen's opportunities for leadership are constrained by traditional gender ste-
reotypes, by inadequate access to mentors and informal networks of support, and
by inflexible workplace structures." 5 1 Women of color find their "performance is
subject to special scrutiny and [their] achievements are often attributed to special
treatment."'52 Attention to stereotypes, mentoring, and workplace structures is
necessary in order to accelerate the pace of change.
Rhode focuses on the content of gender stereotypes as they relate to evalua-
tion of women's performance. As she explains, "the characteristics traditionally
associated with women are at odds with the characteristics traditionally associated
with leadership, such as strength, assertiveness, authoritativeness, and so on."'53
Thus, women, like the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins mentioned above,
still face double binds that can bar their advancement. For example, behavior that
may be seen as appropriately assertive in a man is often seen as inappropriately
aggressive in a woman. As Rhode in this and other work shows, without conscious
changes in institutional networks and structures, the rate of women's advancement
will remain painfully slow.54
Rhode's analysis of gender differences in leadership styles and priorities re-
flects the varied empirical evidence discussed in more detail in her forthcoming
collection. Simplistic generalizations about women's and men's leadership styles
are not grounded in fact. Yet, women's leadership can make a difference in terms
of both style and priorities, and thus, in outcomes.
IV. PROBLEMS OF AGENCY: CONSTRAINTS AND COMPLEXITY
The next four articles deal in various ways with issues of agency. Maria
Ontiveros's article, richly grounded in description of the lives of female farmworkers
and of agricultural employment practices, focuses on the inadequacy of laws that
apply to the situation of women farmworkers in California.55 She also makes
48. See THE DIFFERENCE "DIFFERENCE" MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (Deborah L. Rhode,
ed., 2003).
49. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed sex discrimination in employment as
well as race, color, and national discrimination in employment.
50. Rhode, supra note 14, at 17.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 19. See VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY So SLOW?: THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998);
DEBORAH RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX 145-47 (1997).
54. RHODE, supra note 48.
55. Ontiveros, supra note 9.
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broader points about changing ideas of citizenship and about the labor and em-
ployment law canon. Based on the concept of "identity-based organizing," 56 she
offers some examples of positive change for women farmworkers and provides
several ideas for further development. Interestingly, hers is the only article that
deals with union issues, despite the importance of unions in labor law both histori-
cally and today.57 She explicitly discusses issues of class, which are also raised in
the articles by Martha McCluskey and by Michael Selmi with Naomi Cahn, but
which are often absent or only given lip service in much recent critical and femi-
nist scholarship.58
Each area of labor and employment law privileges certain workers while ex-
cluding and marginalizing others, she shows. The fact that the overtime require-
ments of the Fair Labor Standards Act do not apply to agricultural workers is one
of many examples. Antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII do not reflect the
multiple barriers and types of discrimination faced by female farmworkers, which
include race, national origin, and immigration status. Ontiveros highlights the
fragmented approaches to the myriad workplace issues faced by female farmworkers
(health and safety enforcement in one category, wage and hour enforcement in
another category, discrimination enforcement in still another category). She de-
scribes the transnational lives of female Mexican farmworkers who live in Califor-
nia and also spend time and maintain communities in Mexico. She discusses how
traditional concepts of citizenship, defined by naturalization status, do not fit these
lives and in fact serve as a basis to deny farmworkers basic human rights. She
argues that a new concept of citizenship, defined as including community partici-
pation, can help create conditions for agency. She makes a compelling case for a
nuanced, integrated, bilingual, and bicultural approach to labor policy in this con-
text, including through the creative use of international law.5 9
Libby Adler's essay explores ways that law ascribes (and fails to ascribe) agency
to youth sex workers, both female and male.60 Transgender kids and gay kids are
overrepresented; the majority of youth prostitutes are homeless. 6 1 Adler looks
beyond criminal prohibitions to the background rules of contract and family law.
For kids, running away is illegal, sleeping outside is illegal, and they cannot get a
job to support themselves or sign a binding lease. These rules can create impos-
sible situations, particularly for gay and transgender youth whose parents may be
aggressively trying to "change" them. Noting the correlation between homelessness
56. She defines this as ".recognizing the personal as well as class identity of workers, includ-
ing workers of colour; and recognizing also that these two different types of identity are interre-
lated, both in defining the oppression faced by workers and in finding solutions to it."' Id. at
159 (quoting MARIA L. ONTIVEROS, ANEW COURSE FOR LABOUR UNIONS: IDENTITY-BASED ORGANIZ-
ING AS A RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION 417 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002)).
57. The conference organizers sent out a mailing to approximately 1600 law professors in
October 2001, including all professors in the United States who teach labor law, inviting their
participation. No proposals besides that of Professor Ontiveros were submitted that referred to
unions.
58. McCluskey, supra note 8; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 12. As Angela Harris notes, we lack
a language to talk about issues related to class. Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Jurisprudence
of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. R. 741, 777 (1994) (noting the absence of language "to talk about
interactions between economic relations and symbolic representations").
59. Ontiveros, supra note 9, at 189.
60. Adler, supra note 8.
61. Id. at 194.
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and youth prostitution, she sees much youth prostitution as a "desperate ex-
change." 62
Some youth prostitution, she asserts, may be driven by motivations other than
poverty, and she finds that law does not recognize the potential agency involved.
She uses the example of a house in Revere, Massachusetts, raided by police in the
1970s, where teenaged boys went to get drunk, smoke marijuana, and have sex
with older men for money. No coercion seemed to be involved, and some of the
teens may have gone there because that was where the party was. Simplistic vi-
sions of youth as innocent victims of adults or as total agents held to the same
standards as adults are inadequate to capture the complexity of youth sexual
decisionmaking. While the examples she gives of the potential ambiguities of
sexual agency are of boys, her antiessentialist stance about gender seems to create
the possibility of recognizing potential ambiguities in girls' sexual agency. Her
recognition of the complexities of human agency in many contexts is useful and
insightful, and a reminder of the challenges faced by law and lawmakers.
Rebekah Smith, Luisa Deprez, and Sandra Butler present a comprehensive
and meticulous analysis of welfare policy as it relates to higher education for wel-
fare recipients. 63 One of their central conclusions is that higher education for poor
mothers provides the conditions for their agency.64 They focus on the gendered
nature of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA), commonly known as "welfare reform."' 6 5 Taking aim at poor
women, PRWORA asserts that work outside the home is more important than poor
single mothers taking care of their own children at home.66 Although Smith, Deprez,
and Butler reject PWRORA's assertion that poor women's mothering within the
home is unimportant, their focus is in a different direction. Their focus is on ensur-
ing that poor women have access to work outside the home that is valued. Mothers
without higher education who are forced into work by welfare reform remain at
the margins of the labor market in insecure jobs that lack benefits. Smith, Deprez,
and Butler demonstrate through empirical research that the most effective way for
women on welfare to get off welfare permanently and provide a stable income for
their families is for them to obtain a college education. Yet, PRWORA strongly
discouraged states from providing access to higher education for welfare recipi-
ents, resulting in thousands of poor women having to drop out of school and either
take low-paying unstable jobs or enter workfare programs.
Maine made a "visionary" decision in 1996 to reject the antieducation tenets
of PRWORA, and started a state-funded "Parents as Scholars" program to help
indigent parents attend college. 67 This program, the subject of a longitudinal study
by social scientists Deprez and Butler, has been an unqualified success, enabling
62. Id. (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 102 (1983)).
63. See generally Smith et al., supra note 10.
64. They assert that "education provides low-income women with a means to a career, pos-
sible departure from patriarchal structures both within and outside of the home, independence
and economic well-being, and decision-making over their lives." Id. at 222.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
66. Smith et al., supra note 10, at 214-15. Welfare reform also had powerful racist aspects.
See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Moth-
erhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415,415 (1999).
67. Only one other state, Wyoming, created a separate state-funded program for higher edu-
cation at that time but it was never utilized. Smith et al., supra note 10, at 224 n.75.
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participants to live lives of economic independence and satisfaction that were un-
thinkable before. The pending welfare reauthorization bill may improve or worsen
the situation nationally, depending on what version passes.6 8 Maine's Senator
Olympia Snowe, aware of the Parents as Scholars program, is an important advo-
cate of access to higher education for people on welfare.
One of Smith, Deprez, and Butler's most provocative points is that higher
education can be critically important to promoting gender equity. Demand for
women's productive labor, they and others claim, can diminish gender inequal-
ity.6 9 Access to higher education for poor women is not enough to eliminate gen-
der-based inequality in "both private and public spheres," but it should be the pri-
ority. Other important factors, in their view, include "assuring pay equity, raising
the minimum wage, eliminating job segregation, increasing union affiliation, pro-
moting labor market opportunities, stabilizing benefits, and securing availability
of supportive services." '7 0 All of these measures relate to valuing women's work
outside the home in the labor market, and create a useful foundation for thinking
about the care work articles later in this volume.7 1 Smith, Deprez, and Butler's
article powerfully supports the recommendation of focusing on women's access to
education as a priority, made by Michael Selmi and Naomi Cahn in more general
terms later in this volume.7 2
Tracy Higgins's thought-provoking essay explores explanations for continu-
ing workplace gender segregation despite formal equality and nondiscrimination
principles. 73 She also uses insights from feminist critiques of agency to question
both Title VII jurisprudence and feminist arguments for redistributing costs of care
work.
Higgins notes that Title VII does not provide a reliable way to attack employ-
ment practices that enforce women's inequality. For example, under Title VII's
disparate impact theory, a plaintiff need not show that an employer intended to
discriminate against her, but may win by showing that an unjustified, facially neu-
tral practice operated to her disadvantage. But this theory is narrower than it ini-
tially may seem. For example, if a woman claims that an employer's mandatory
overtime policy discriminates against women because of their childcare responsi-
bilities, an employer may successfully defend by saying that the childcare respon-
sibilities are the choice of women. Thus, "[r]elying on the rhetoric of choice,
courts regard segregated employment patterns as a product of individual prefer-
ence rather than illegal discrimination."'74
Higgins usefully summarizes one of the important theoretical contributions of
feminism-its critiques of traditional liberal theory: "Liberal theory assumes that
individuals enjoy a relatively robust and undifferentiated capacity for choice. This
68. As of this writing in mid-January 2003, the Senate has not passed a reauthorization bill.
Although the 107th Congress was unable to pass a reauthorization bill, the law is continued until
March 31, 2003. Three-month extensions are likely to continue while the 108th Congress delib-
erates. Id. at 237.
69. Smith et al., supra note 10, at 238.
70. Id. at 239-40.
71. Higgins, supra note 6; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 12; McCluskey, supra note 8.
72. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 12.
73. Higgins, supra note 6.
74. Id. at 251.
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assumption, in turn, informs economic theory, social policy, and conceptions of
justice and fairness."'75 Simply put, if something is seen as a choice, it is seen as
fair. Feminist critiques raise foundational issues about this assumption of choice:
"If, however, women and men are differently situated with respect to capacity for
choice, then facially neutral social policies premised on assumptions of equal agency
will in fact perpetuate gender hierarchy." 7 6 Choice, to Higgins, is "deeply
gendered," which means that theories using choice as a justification for redistribu-
tion will not lead to gender equality.7 7 While feminist critiques of agency have
been directed at a range of areas, they have not been directed at Title VII jurispru-
dence as a whole, according to Higgins. Further analysis of Title VII in light of the
feminist critiques of agency, she suggests, should challenge the assumption that
fairness and choice are necessarily linked.
Higgins then turns to the debate over policy alternatives for "care work," which
she defines as "the work of caring for the family, especially children, and the bur-
den such work imposes on women's performance in the paid labor force."'7 8 She
finds that much feminist work in this area does not fully use theories of limited
agency but rather relies, implicitly or explicitly, on the liberal model of individual
choice. According to her reading of this literature, if women are assumed to have
a choice, then no remedy is called for. She uses the example of a recent article by
Mary Ann Case, which she says assumes that women have unencumbered choices
about having responsibility for children, and therefore argues that it would be un-
fair to women without children to redistribute the costs of children more broadly.79
And on the other hand, if women's choices are constrained, according to the litera-
ture Higgins examines, then a remedy is called for. She uses examples from the
work of Vicki Schultz and Joan Williams to show that their arguments for redistri-
bution of costs depend partly on assumptions that women's choices are con-
strained.80 Higgins suggests that empirical questions of how policies affect indi-
vidual decisions are important but that these empirical questions about choice 81
should be distinct from questions of justice and fairness. If feminists thoroughly
challenge the assumption that choice and fairness are linked, they may be able to
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 259.
78. ld. at 253.
79. Mary Ann Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where,
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753
(2001).
80. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care
as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2001).
81. She acknowledges the importance of empirical research into how policies might affect
women:
Of course, debates over the empirical dimensions of women's exercise of choice within
our culture are necessary and productive to the extent that they yield insight into
individuals' likely responses to policy changes. How will women respond to policies
recognizing the market value of housework within marriage? To what extent will
enhanced supports for parenting (work that is currently mostly done by women) rein-
force traditional patriarchal structures within marriage?
Higgins, supra note 6, at 258.
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"articulate alternative accounts of justice and human flourishing that are more likely
to lead both to gender integration and gender equality than those prevailing under
our current liberal model." 82 Higgins's piece, with its insightful discussion about
agency and its explorations of the care work debate, provides a useful segue to the
final set of articles.
V. CARE WORK AND THE WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT
The final three papers all are important contributions to the literature about
care work and the work/family conflict. 83 Michael Selmi and Naomi Cahn ques-
tion the wisdom of the recent feminist focus on valuing care work, articulating the
concern that "emphasizing care work will ultimately lead to policies designed to
facilitate women's work in the home without substantially changing the gender
dynamics of the home or the workplace."' 84 They draw parallels between the po-
litical right's emphasis on promoting marriage as the route out of poverty for women,
and the political left's emphasis on proposals to accommodate or facilitate care
work outside of the labor market, arguing that "each set of proposals can be seen as
reinforcing, and in some ways reifying, women's role within the home. ' 85
They question the empirical assumptions, implicit in much of the care work
literature, that most women can not balance the demands of work and family, and
that women in large numbers are dropping out of the workforce because of this
inability.86 They further note that much of the care work literature focuses prima-
rily on the situation of female professionals, and that it is therefore classist in
nature. 87 They note that the care work literature denies resting on a normative
preference for care work over paid work, or on a notion that care work is "women's
work." Nonetheless, they find such a normative preference for care work in the
proposals put forward by care work literature, "all of which are designed to facili-
tate, or accommodate, care work outside of the labor market rather than to lighten
the burden of care work so as to enable women to devote more time to paid wage
work."' 88 Rather than focusing on revaluing care work, the strategic emphasis
should be on increasing women's access to education, changing the structure of
the school day and the school year, and combating sex discrimination at work, they
assert.89 This article is a challenging addition to the care work debate.
Martha McCluskey's essay takes the care work discussion in a new, creative
direction.90 She looks at family caretaking for workers rather than dependents in
order to examine the conflict between market work and family care. Paying rigor-
ous attention to issues of class, race, and sexuality, as well as gender, she high-
82. Id. at 259.
83. Katharine Silbaugh, who edited the recent Chicago-Kent Symposium on the structures of
care work, also attended the conference and gave a fascinating presentation that focused on the
extraordinarily large value, worldwide, of care work performed by women. See, e.g., Sympo-
sium, The Structures of Care Work, supra note 11. (Videotape on file with Garbrecht Law
Library, University of Maine School of Law).
84. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 12, at 299.
85. Id. at 291.
86. Id. at 301.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 306.
89. Id. at 306-12.
90. McCluskey, supra note 8.
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lights the background rules of tax and social security and how they treat various
types of wage earners and family arrangements. These background rules create
what she calls a "system of public support for workers' care." 9 1 High-end wage
earners with non-wage earning spouses are treated most favorably by tax and so-
cial security, resulting in a major public benefit to these wage earners. This benefit
is masked by a powerful ideology that holds that while families with a mother on
welfare are "dependent," families with a high-end wage earner and non-wage earn-
ing spouse are "self-sufficient." She urges the recognition that household labor is
not synonymous with childcare. Further, she highlights the fact that non-wage
earning spouses of high-end wage earners often provide many services that are not
recognized by the market. McCluskey advocates revising the system "so that pub-
lic support is redirected to the basic care needs of low- and moderate-income workers
and to paid care work-as well as to unpaid care work performed by workers for
themselves or by relatively equal-earning spouses. ' 92 By focusing on worker care
rather than childcare, McCluskey reframes the debate over care work in a way that
might bridge existing divides concerning work/family issues and recommended
policy priorities.
Michelle A. Travis focuses on telecommuting as it relates to work/family con-
flicts, and also sheds light on the relationship between technology and society.93
Far from being the idyllic, gender-equalizing technology that some predicted,
telecommuting has worked to the disadvantage of women, further marginalizing
their place in the workforce and not raising their status at home. 94 Telecommuting
could play an important role in restructuring workplaces in the way that many
feminists advocate, but it is a technology that is a part of society and as such oper-
ates according to societal constraints. As she shows, there are two worlds of
telecommuting; one for a privileged category, consisting mostly of men, which
involves increased convenience and no loss of benefits or status. By contrast,
most women's telecommuting experience has been linked to increased casualization
of jobs, and loss of benefits, status, and opportunities for advancement.
Travis warns that "there is a very real risk that telecommuting will become a
modem-day version of the historic, exploitative forms of industrial homework that
were prevalent in the United States in the early and mid-twentieth century."9 5 She
draws on the history of legislation regulating industrial homework, which like other
special legislation, effectively "reinforced the preexisting gender segregation and
91. Id. at 327.
92. Id. McCluskey favors "revising family tax and social security support to tie benefits to
individual low and modest earnings rather than to high earnings, marital status, and to unequal
marital earnings." Id. She plans to expand on the possibilities for reform in a future article.
93. Travis, supra note 13.
94. Travis's presentation was accompanied by various advertisements with photographs show-
ing women and men telecommuters. These materials reflected the empirical data that Travis
discussed, that when men telecommuted they tended to have a separate space in their home and
did not take on additional child care responsibilities, while when women telecommuted they
tended to work in a central location and increase their childcare responsibilities. The images
included a man talking on the phone in a study looking out at a child riding a bicycle and waving
at the child, and a woman talking on the phone in a kitchen with a sleeping baby by her side. In
another image, a woman worked in a central area while her daughter sat nearby apparently
happily doing schoolwork. (Videotape on file with Garbrecht Law Library, University of Maine
School of Law).
95. Travis, supra note 13, at 277.
96. Id. at 283.
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inequality in both paid and unpaid work. ' 96 Instead of special legislation aimed at
the evils of telecommuting, she recommends framing the issue as an "equal oppor-
tunity" issue, advocates conceptualizing telecommuting arrangements that work
to the disadvantage of women as sex discrimination, and suggests expanding anti-
discrimination law to cover caregivers and imposing an accommodation duty on
employers as disability discrimination law does.97
V. CONCLUSION
Several salient points emerge from considering each of these articles and es-
says as part of a larger whole. First, an impressively broad range of concerns are
implicated by the theme of Law, Labor, and Gender, ranging from welfare reform
and education, to women and leadership, to conditions of work for farmworker
women, to transgender issues in the workplace. Second, the promise of formal
equality and freedom from employment discrimination on the basis of sex made
by Title VII has not been fulfilled by courts in several contexts. Third, close atten-
tion must be paid to the specifics of different employment situations in order to
begin to grasp their complexities for the people involved. Fourth, in order to for-
mulate laws and policy proposals, we must confront the tensions that inhere in our
understanding of agency. Fifth, analysis of contexts and assumptions, together
with a broader focus on empirical evidence, can lead us to useful generalizations
and productive debate about policy recommendations. The authors show us that
while specific legal reforms are urgent in some areas, law reform is not a compre-
hensive solution. In some areas, efforts to change informal structures are essen-
tial. In other areas, more analysis and debate are necessary. I want to thank the
authors for their contributions and cooperation in the development of this sympo-
sium issue. My hope is that this Symposium will foster discussion, and where
appropriate, action, and will contribute to the ongoing debates on the important
issues examined here.
97. Id. at 285-86.
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